RICHMOND, VA A federal appeals panel held that 18 U.S.C. 922(n), which bars individuals under felony indictment from transporting firearms or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce, does not violate the Second Amendment. In the case of Brandon Glen Jackson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district courts refusal to dismiss the indictment, concluding that the government had shown sufficient historical analogues to justify the statute under the Supreme Courts Bruen framework. Applying Bruens two-step approach, the panel first considered whether Jacksons conduct fell within the Amendments plain text. Jackson had placed a handgun in a vehicle and driven across state lines. The court reasoned that traveling with a firearm constitutes keeping in the constitutional sense because the owner retains custody and control. Although the government argued that interstate transport placed the activity outside the Second Amendments protection, the panel disagreed at this initial step and treated the conduct as covered by the text. At step two, the court evaluated whether 922(n) is consistent with the Nations historical tradition of firearm regulation. The government identified several regulatory threads, but the panel focused on two that it deemed persuasive: surety laws and the historical practice of disarming individuals considered dangerous or untrustworthy. Surety laws allowed authorities to impose conditionsincluding temporary disarmamenton persons accused of carrying dangerous weapons, providing a relevant analogue for temporary restrictions during the pendency of criminal charges. Separately, the court pointed to a recognized tradition of categorical limits on access to arms for groups viewed as likely to misuse them, a principle the Fourth Circuit has previously acknowledged. Synthesizing these analogues, the panel concluded that 922(n) imposes a temporary, case-linked restraint that aligns with historic practices. The ruling emphasized that the statute addresses a discrete statusbeing under indictmentduring which public-safety concerns are heightened and judicial oversight is ongoing. Because the government met its burden at Bruens historical inquiry, the panel held that the law may constitutionally restrict the transport of firearms or ammunition by felony indictees across state lines. Procedurally, Jackson had entered a conditional guilty plea after the district court denied his motion to dismiss the federal charge. On appeal, he argued that the statute facially conflicts with the Second Amendment and that, at a minimum, his conduct should be protected. The Fourth Circuit rejected those arguments, noting that even though the conduct is within the Amendments textual scope, the government demonstrated a well-established tradition supporting temporary disarmament of accused persons and categorical limits aimed at those deemed dangerous. Accordingly, the panel affirmed and left 922(n) intact as applied in Jacksons case. The decision highlights a recurring post-Bruen pattern: courts may accept that conduct falls within the Second Amendments text yet sustain a regulation at the historical-tradition stage by identifying sufficiently analogous founding-era practices. For gun owners facing indictments, the practical takeaway is that transporting firearms or ammunition across state lines remains prohibited under 922(n) while charges are pending. For prosecutors and defense counsel, the opinion clarifies that surety-style conditions and dangerous-person analogues can justify time-limited restraints tied to criminal process.